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CARRIE WAS HAPPILY MARRIED for nine years when she became
pregnant.' During her second trimester, she received test results con-
firming her baby had Cat Eye Syndrome in every cell of her body and
that her kidneys were starting to malfunction. 2 Carrie and her hus-
band made the best decision they could with the information they
had.3 Carrie explains, "We wanted her. But we didn't want to con-
dem[n] her to [a] life of agony."4
Women typically seek second trimester abortions for three rea-
sons.5 First, medical tests for certain grave conditions and disorders
cannot be administered until well into the second trimester.6 Upon
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1. Brief of the Institute for Reproductive Health Access et al. as Amici Curiae Sup-
porting Respondents at 10, Gonzales v. Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am., 127 S. Ct. 1610
(2007) (No. 05-1382).
2. d. "Cat Eye syndrome typically results in the grotesque malformation of a fetus's
skull and facial features. Additional conditions associated with the chromosomal disorder
include malformations of the heart, kidneys, and intestinal and anal systems." Id. at 7.
3. Id. at 10.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 2, 11, 13. See generally CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, ABOR-
TION SURVEILLANCE - UNITED STATES (2003), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/
preview/mmwrhtml/ss5511al.htm. "The gestational age at which an abortion is obtained
can be influenced by multiple factors including level of education, availability and accessi-
bility of abortion services, timing of confirmation of pregnancy, timing of personal deci-
sion-making, timing of prenatal diagnosis, fear of discovery of pregnancy, and denial of
pregnancy." d
6. Brief of the Institute for Reproductive Health Access et al. as Amici Curiae Sup-
porting Respondents at 6-7, Gonzales v. Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am., 127 S. Ct.
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hearing that their child is unlikely to survive labor or will be con-
demned to a life of pain, some women, like Carrie, choose to termi-
nate the pregnancy. 7
Second, women may choose a second trimester abortion if the
pregnancy imperils their health.8 For these women, the abortion will
likely preserve their ability to have healthy children in the future.9 For
example, during Sara's pregnancy she had early onset preeclampsia, a
"condition where a woman's blood pressure becomes seriously ele-
vated," which caused a great risk of stroke or seizure.10 She also had a
condition where the placenta blocked the birth canal, and the pla-
centa was so "abnormally massive" that if the pregnancy spontaneously
naturally ended, there was a great chance she would suffer massive
hemorrhaging.1 1 Sara said, "My child was dying and I was really
sick."'1 2 Her doctor recommended a dilation and extraction ("D&E")
abortion which she had on the same afternoon.' 3
Third, women face second trimester abortions when they have
been unable to access medical care because of financial, geographical,
or other obstacles. 14 In some cases, some women do not realize for
several months that they are pregnant.15 One woman explained that
she was unemployed and had no health insurance. 16 She was strug-
gling to support herself and to take care of her immediate needs; her
health was secondary.' 7 Additionally, it was normal for her to go for
extended periods of time without menstruating.1 8 As a result, she did
1610 (2007) (No. 05-1382). "Amniocentesis is the most common and accurate prenatal test
used to diagnose serious birth defects. It is generally not available before the fifteenth week
of pregnancy." Id. at 6-7 n.1l.
7. Id. at 10.
8. Id. at 13.
9. Id. at 16.
10. Id. at 14-15.
11. See id. at 15.
12. Id.
13. Id. D&E is the "usual" abortion method used in the second trimester. Gonzales v.
Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1620 (2007). During a D&E procedure, "[a] doctor must first
dilate the cervix at least to the extent needed to insert surgical instruments into the uterus
and to maneuver them to evacuate the fetus." Id. Next, "[a]fter sufficient dilation the surgi-
cal operation can commence. The woman is placed under general anesthesia or conscious
sedation. The doctor, often guided by ultrasound, inserts grasping forceps through the
women's cervix ... to grab the fetus." Id. The doctor may make "10 to 15 passes with the
forceps" until the fetus is entirely removed. Id.
14. Brief of the Institute for Reproductive Health Access, supra note 1, at 6-7, at 2.
15. Id. at 20-21.
16. Id. at 20.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 20-21.
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not find out she was pregnant until her second trimester. 19 Because of
these and other reasons, she obtained an intact dilation and extrac-
tion ("D&X") abortion. 20 Today, the Federal Partial-Birth Abortion
Ban Act of 2003 (the "federal ban" or "ban") prohibits this
procedure. 21
One cannot overstate the problem of limited access to abortion
providers. Eighty-six percent of all counties in the United States have
no abortion provider. 22 By 2000, the declining number of providers
meant that one-third of American women between the ages of fifteen
and forty-four lived in counties without abortion services. 23 Therefore,
many women must travel long distances to find a physician; for exam-
ple, in 2000, one in four women traveled more than fifty miles to ob-
tain an abortion. 24 State-mandated waiting periods :impose an
additional obstacle and add to the delay. 25 Between health complica-
tions and barriers to accessing abortion services, women often face the
decision to abort during the second trimester for reasons out of their
control.
On April 18, 2007, the Supreme Court dramatically changed its
course on abortion jurisprudence by upholding the federal ban in
Gonzales v. Carhart.26 The ban outlaws at least one safe method of sec-
ond-trimester abortions and introduces Congress's (and any state leg-
islature's) new authority to define a woman's right to reproductive
health. 27
In 2000, the Court affirmed the constitutional requirement that
laws restricting abortion contain a health exception. 28 Seven years
19. Id.
20. Id. at 21 n.7. The D&X procedure involves removing the fetus in an intact condi-
tion rather than dismembering it in the uterus. The D&E and D&X methods are both used
to terminate pregnancies beginning at about twelve weeks, after the fetus has grown too
big to be removed by the suction method commonly used in the first trimester, when
eighty-five percent to ninety percent of all abortions take place. Linda Greenhouse, In
Reversal of Course, Justices, 5-4, Back Ban on Abortion Method, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2007, at Al.
21. 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (Supp. IV 2006).
22. Lawrence B. Finer & Stanley K. Henshaw, GUTrMACHER INSTITUTE, AFTER THREE
DECADES OF LEGAL ABORTION, NEW RESEARCH DOCUMENTS DECLINES IN RATES, NUMBERS AND
ACCESS TO ABORTION SERVICES, at 6 (Jan./Feb. 2003).
23. Id. at 11.
24. Id.
25. See An Overview of Abortion Laws, STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF (Guttmacher Inst. ed.
June 1, 2007), http://www.guttrnacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spibOA-L.pdf (last visited
Sept. 5, 2007).
26. 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007).
27. See 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (Supp. IV 2006); Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1637.
28. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530. U.S. 914 (2000).
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later, with blatant disregard for the previous decision, a new Court
reversed direction, approving Congress's conclusion that a health ex-
ception is not necessary for the federal ban.29 The ban imposes crimi-
nal sanctions on doctors who perform the prohibited procedures
regardless of the doctor's professional medical judgment about what
is best for the health of his or her patient.30 Prior to the Court's deci-
sion, lower court rulings blocked the ban from taking effect.
3 1
Under the current Supreme Court precedent governing abortion
restrictions, the "undue burden test," a state regulation with the pur-
pose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman
seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus violates the Constitution. 32
Most legal challenges to restrictions on abortions have exclusively
sought to demonstrate that the challenged restriction has an im-
proper effect on women's access to abortion. 33 Experience has shown
that demonstrating improper effect is an arduous burden because it is
a highly fact-sensitive inquiry.34 However, relying on the purpose
prong of the undue burden test is a relatively clear-cut method to
prove the unconstitutional character of a law.35
Evidence of improper purpose is likely available pre-implementa-
tion of a law, whereas proof of improper effect might not be.36 Judi-
cial reliance on the purpose prong would deter legislative
overreaching by invalidating laws clearly outside constitutional lim-
its.37 Analysis of purpose reveals the big picture and shows what Con-
gress truly meant to accomplish with the law. In the abortion context,
it enables judges to avoid the difficult task of sifting through complex
medical data and answering unanswerable questions, such as when life
begins. Reliance on the purpose prong is particularly important be-
cause behind Congress's medical findings lies a calculated and uncon-
29. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1637.
30. 18 U.S.C. § 1531.
31. Greenhouse, supra note 20.
32. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992).
33. Linda J. Wharton et al., Preserving the Core of Roe: Reflectzons on Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 18 YALE J.L. & FEMINiSm 317, 354 (2006).
34. See id. at 377.
35. See zd.
36. Id.
37. See Harvard Law Review Ass'n, After Ayotte: The Need to Defend Abortion Rights with
Renewed "Purpose", 119 HARV. L. REV. 2552, 2565 (2006).
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stitutional intent to pass the federal ban as a stepping stone to
overturn Roe v. Wade.
38
This Note focuses on the purpose prong of the undue burden
test and argues that the federal ban is unconstitutional because its
only purpose is to impose an undue burden on a woman's right to
seek an abortion. 39 The federal ban's purpose is to dismantle the ana-
lytical framework for evaluating abortion regulations that the Su-
preme Court established in Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.40 Yet, in Gonzales v. Carhart, the ma-
jority turned its head and ignored the ban's glaring illegal purpose. 41
The ban's legislative history, the plain language of the statute, and the
insincerity of the government's alleged interests all clearly illustrate
this illegal purpose. Opposite upholding the ban, the Court should
have struck it down entirely because its purpose is to lay the founda-
tion for overturning Roe.
While the Court recognizes that the state has a legitimate interest
from the outset of pregnancy in protecting the health and life of the
woman and the potentiality of life, 42 banning certain methods of abor-
tion does not advance these interests. The ban prohibits women from
receiving particular types of abortion procedures, forcing doctors to
use riskier procedures to avoid criminal liability only to obtain the
same outcome.
43
Because the result is unchanged-the fetus is aborted with or
without the ban-the state's alleged interest in the life of the fetus is
illusory. Yet the effect of the ban is worse because the health of the
woman is compromised, thereby failing to advance the interest in wo-
38. 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, Pub. L. No.
108-105, § 2, 117 Stat. 1201, 1201-1206 (2003) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1531 notes 1-14
(Supp. IV 2006)).
39. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992).
40. 505 U.S. 833.
41. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1627 (2007). The majority took the fed-
eral ban at face value, refusing to look beyond the text of the law. "A straightforward read-
ing of the [federal ban's] text demonstrates its purpose and the scope of its provisions: It
regulates and proscribes... performing the intact D&E procedure." Id.
42. Casey, 505 U.S. at 834.
43. "Substantial record evidence shows the intact D&E procedure that the Act forbids
is essential if women and their doctors are to have access to the safest means of terminating
a pregnancy after the first trimester." Brief of the National Women's Law Center et al. as
Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 7, Gonzales v. Planned Parenthood Fed'n of
Am., 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007) (No. 05-1382) [hereinafter Brief of the National Women's Law
Center].
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men's health. 44 By legislating under the guise of legitimate state inter-
ests, Congress uses preservation of women's health and the
potentiality of life as pretext to accomplish indirectly what the Su-
preme Court in Roe and Casey would not allow it to accomplish di-
rectly.45 In Gonzales v. Carhart, the Supreme Court should have struck
down the federal ban as unconstitutional because it promotes an ille-
gal purpose-Congress's sole purpose in passing the law was the de-
mise of women's reproductive freedom.
Part I of this Note describes the federal ban and includes a brief
discussion of Congress's medical findings. Part II describes the
landmark cases in abortion jurisprudence and the development of the
undue burden test, focusing on the Court's treatment of the purpose
prong. Part III presents Gonzales v. Carhart and the procedural history
of the two cases heard before the Supreme Court. Part TV applies the
purpose prong of the undue burden test to the federal ban. It ana-
lyzes the law's legislative history and plain language, and it examines
the truth behind the government's alleged interests in passing the
ban. This analysis leads to the conclusion that the Court should have
invalidated the federal ban because it has an unconstitutional
purpose.
I. The Federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003
Since 1995, anti-choice groups have waged a political campaign
to eliminate the right to particular abortion procedures as part of
their movement to overturn Roe.46 The National Right to Life Com-
44. Precluding women from obtaining intact D&Es endangers their health and in-
trudes on their most personal family decisions, with life-long adverse consequences. For
example, a woman who suffers from hemorrhage or infection from a perforated uterus or
lacerated cervix-because the intact procedure most likely to avoid those complications
was outlawed-could face hospitalization and surgery, including a possible hysterectomy.
Id. at 13.
45. SeeJeffrey A. Van Detta, Constitutzonalizing Roe, Casey and Carhart: A Legislative
Due-Process Anti-Discrimination Principle that Gives Constitutional Content to the "Undue Burden"
Standard of Review Applied to Abortion Control Legislation, 10 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD.
211, 212 (2001).
"[I]ntelligent scrutiny reveals that most of this legislative activity has been little
more than an attempt to use doctrinal loopholes of Roe and Casey to accomplish
indirectly what Roe and Casey purportedly prevent the states from accomplishing
directly-severely limiting, even prohibiting, a woman's exercise of a right of
choice within the framework of a broader right of reproductive autonomy."
Id. at 212.
46. CENTER FOR REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS, UNCONSTITUTIONAL ASSAULT ON THE RIGHT TO
CHOOSE, 3 (Dec. 2003), available at http://www.reproductiverights.org/pdf/pub-bp-
unconassault.pdf.
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mittee coined the term "partial-birth" abortion as an inflammatory
way to refer to the procedure medically known as intact dilation and
extraction. 47 "Partial-birth" is not a medical term and cannot be found
in any medical textbook.48 The title of the federal statute thus uses
political terms created to aid anti-abortion advocates in their crusade
against Roe.49
The federal ban is the first ever federal law criminalizing an abor-
tion procedure, and it was the subject of the litigation in Gonzales v.
Carhart.50 The federal ban prohibits any physician from "knowingly
perform[ing] a partial-birth abortion and thereby kill[ing] a human
fetus."5 1
The drafters of the ban intentionally excluded a health excep-
tion,52 even though the Supreme Court expressly required a health
exception in Stenberg v. Carhart.53 There is a critical difference be-
tween a life exception and a health exception; both are required by
the Supreme Court when the government regulates abortion. 54 Casey
held that subsequent to viability, the state may regulate or even pro-
scribe abortion, except "where it is necessary, in appropriate medical
judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother."55
The federal ban contains a life exception: "This subsection does not
apply to a partial-birth abortion that is necessary to save the life of a
mother whose life is endangered by a physical disorder, physical ill-
47. Linda Greenhouse, U.S. Supports Bid to Uphold Ohio Limits on Abortions, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 8, 2002, at A18.
48. Brief of the American Medical Women's Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents at 2 n.2, Gonzales v. Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am., 127 S. Ct. 1610
(2007) (No. 05-1382) [hereinafter Brief of the American Medical Women's Ass'n]. "'Par-
tial-birth abortion' is a medically meaningless oxymoron .... The term 'partial-birth' abor-
tion . . . is neither recognized in the medical literature nor used by physicians who
routinely perform second trimester abortions." Brief of NARAL Pro-Choice America Foun-
dation et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 2 n.3, Gonzales v. Planned
Parenthood Fed'n of Am., 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007) (No. 05-1382). Partial-birth abortion is a
term of art that means whatever the applicable statute says it means. See Stenberg v. Car-
hart, 530 U.S. 914, 950 (2000) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (comparing definitions of par-
tial-birth abortion in statutes enacted by the legislatures of four states).
49. "'Partial-birth abortion' is a fabricated term that anti-choice activists concocted in
an attempt to make almost all abortions illegal." CENTER FOR REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS, supra
note 46, at 10.
50. Brief of the National Women's Law Center, supra note 43, at 4 n.2.
51. 18 U.S.C. § 1531(a) (Supp. IV 2006).
52. See id.
53. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 914.
54. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992).
55. Id.
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ness, or physical injury, including a life-endangering physical condi-
tion caused by or arising from the pregnancy itself."56
However, the ban does not include a health exception. 57 In Doe v.
Bolton,58 Roe's companion case, the Court clarified that "health" must
be defined broadly to include both physical and mental well-being. 59
The Court said that "medical judgment may be exercised in the light
of all factors-physical, emotional, psychological, familial, and the wo-
man's age-relevant to the well-being of the patient. All these factors
may relate to health. ' 60 Such concern for women's health is absent
from the federal ban.
Congress concluded that "partial-birth abortion remains a disfa-
vored procedure that is not only unnecessary to preserve the health of
the mother, but in fact poses serious risks to the long-term health of
women and in some circumstances, their lives." 61 In direct contradic-
tion to Congress's opinion, the American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists (representing approximately ninety percent of all
board-certified obstetricians and gynecologists) stated that the abor-
tion procedures targeted by the ban are necessary alternatives for phy-
sicians to use in certain circumstances to prevent serious harm to
women.
6 2
As defined by Congress, "partial-birth abortion" is when a physi-
cian "deliberately and intentionally vaginally delivers a living fetus, un-
til, in the case of a head-first presentation, the entire fetal head is
outside the body of the mother, or, in the case of the breech presenta-
tion, any part of the fetal trunk past the navel is outside the body of
the mother, for the purpose of performing an overt act that the per-
son knows will kill the partially delivered living fetus. ... 63 Attorney
56. 18 U.S.C. § 1531(a).
57. See 18 U.S.C. § 1531.
58. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
59. Id. at 192.
60. Id.
61. Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-105, § 2(2), 117 Stat.
1201, 1201 (2003) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1531 note 2).
62. Brief of the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents at 1, 10-17, Gonzales v. Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am., 127 S.
Ct. 1610 (2007) (No. 05-1382) [hereinafter Brief of the American College of Obstetricians
and Gynecologists]. "Among D&E procedures, those in which the fetus is delivered intact,
or relatively intact, offer potentially significant health advantages .... The intact approach
reduces the risk of the most severe complications of D&Es involving dismemberment by
minimizing instrumentation and reducing the chances of retained fetal tissue." Id. at
10-11. The brief also states that intact D&E is the safest procedure available for women
with certain medical conditions. Id. at 13.
63. 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (b) (1) (A) (Supp. IV 2006).
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General Alberto R. Gonzales stated that the ban prohibits a "late-term
abortion procedure known interchangeably as dilation and extraction
(D&X) or intact dilation and evacuation (intact D&E), in which a phy-
sician partially delivers the fetus intact (i.e., without first dismember-
ing it) and then kills the fetus, typically by puncturing its skull and
vacuuming out its brain."6 4 Any physician who violates the law will be
fined and imprisoned for up to two years. 65
The congressional findings section of the statute begins by stating
that: "A moral, medical, and ethical consensus exists that the practice
of performing a partial-birth abortion . . . is a gruesome and inhu-
mane procedure that is never medically necessary and should be pro-
hibited." 66 The findings section does not elaborate further on the
alleged moral and ethical consensus, though, notably, the Supreme
Court relied heavily on morality in its decision to uphold the ban.67
The Court held that the ban is a legitimate exercise of the govern-
ment's interest in promoting fetal life because, "[riespect for human
life finds an ultimate expression in the bond of love the mother has
for her child."68 The ban protects the mental and moral health of
women because, the majority claims, "some women come to regret
their choice to abort the infant life they once created and sus-
tained .... Severe depression and loss of esteem can follow."69
The findings section includes several paragraphs discussing the
legislative hearings that led Congress to conclude that intact D&E is
never medically necessary.70 It states: "substantial evidence ... demon-
strates that a partial-birth abortion is never necessary to preserve the
health of a woman, poses significant health risks to a woman upon
whom the procedure is performed and is outside the standard of med-
ical care."' 7 1 The congressional findings supporting the federal ban
64. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 2, Gonzales v. Planned Parenthood Fed'n of
Am., 127 S. Ct. 1610 (No. 05-1382).
65. 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (a).
66. § 2(1), 117 Stat. at 1201 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1531 note 1). Moral opposition to
a medical procedure is not (or, at least, was not) a permissible ground for upholding legis-
lation. In Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003),Justice Kennedy said, "'Our obligation is
to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral code."' Id. at 571 (quoting
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992)). In Casey, the Court
explained that whether or not a State views a practice as "immoral" is "not a sufficient
reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice." Casey, 505 U.S. at 850.
67. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1633-34 (2007).
68. Id. at 1634.
69. Id. The Court conceded that it actually had "no reliable data to measure [this]
phenomenon...." Id.
70. See§ 2, 117 Stat. at 1201-1206 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1531 notes 1-14).
71. § 2(5), 117 Stat. at 1202 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1531 note 5).
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did not withstand inspection by the lower courts; however, the Su-
preme Court accepted them.72
The drafters anticipated the struggle over the appropriate defer-
ence the Court should give to Congress's factual findings, as the find-
ings section boldly declares that Congress's findings of fact supersede
those of the judiciary. 73 This argument is contrary to the recent Su-
preme Court decision in United States. v. Morrison.74 However, judicial
deference to congressional fact-finding is beyond the scope of this
Note.
II. Landmark Cases in Abortion Jurisprudence and the
Development of the Undue Burden Test
Since Roe in 1973, Congress and the Supreme Court have strug-
gled to define a woman's right to abortion.75 Roe represents the high-
water mark for protection of abortion rights. 76 Casey altered key as-
pects of Roe when the Court announced a new test to replace Roe's
strict scrutiny test.77 The Casey test is by its plain terms78 a disjunctive
test that entails review of either the law's effect or its purpose.
79
72. See Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1643 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Nat'l Abortion Fed'n v.
Ashcroft, 330 F. Supp. 2d 436, 482 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) ("Congress did not ... carefully con-
sider the evidence before arriving at its findings."); Nat'l Abortion Fed'n v. Gonzales, 437
F.3d 278 (2d. Cir. 2006); see also Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am. v. Ashcroft, 320 F.
Supp. 2d 957, 1019 (N.D. Cal. 2004) ("iNlone of the six physicians who testified before
Congress had ever performed an intact D&E. Several did not provide abortion services at
all, and one was not even an obgyn .... [T]he oral testimony before Congress was not only
unbalanced, but intentionally polemic."), aff'd, 435 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2006); Carhart v.
Ashcroft, 331 F. Supp. 2d 805, 1011 (D. Neb. 2004) ("Congress arbitrarily relied upon the
opinions of doctors who claimed to have no (or very little) recent and relevant experiences
with surgical abortions, and disregarded the views of doctors who had significant and rele-
vant experience with those procedures."), affid, 413 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 2005).
73. § 2(8), 117 Stat. at 1202 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1531 note 8).
74. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). In United States v. Morrison, the Supreme Court emphasized
that the powers of the legislature are limited. See id. at 608. The Court explicitly indicated
that the judiciary does not have to defer to congressional findings. See id. at 614.
75. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 819
(Aspen Publishers 2006).
76. See id.
77. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876 (1992).
78. Harvard Law Review Ass'n, supra note 37, at 2566.
79. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877.
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A. The Supreme Court's Framework for a Woman's Right to
Choose an Abortion: From Strict Scrutiny to the Undue
Burden Test
Roe first recognized that a woman's right to choose an abortion is
a fundamental right protected by the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.8 0 The Court established that abortion restrictions
were subject to the highly protective strict scrutiny standard. 8 1 Under
the strict scrutiny standard of constitutional review, regulations limit-
ing fundamental rights, like the right to abortion, can only be justified
by a "compelling state interest,"8 2 and legislative enactments must be
"narrowly drawn to express only legitimate interests at stake."8 3
The Roe Court noted that the state has an important interest both
in preserving and protecting the health of the woman and in the po-
tentiality of life.8 4 The Court evaluated these interests according to a
trimester framework, finding that each interest is separate and distinct
and grows as the woman approaches term. 85
During the first trimester of the pregnancy, the Court prohibited
the state from interfering with a woman's right to seek an abortion. 86
The state's interest in the health of the mother only became compel-
ling during the second trimester, when it could regulate "to the extent
that the regulation reasonably relate [d] to the preservation and pro-
tection of maternal health. '8 7 The state's interest in potential life did
not become compelling until the third trimester, upon viability.8 8 At
this stage, the state could go as far as proscribing abortion altogether
to advance its interest in protecting fetal life, except when abortion
was necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother.89
Roe established the first standard for Supreme Court review of
statutory restrictions on a woman's right to seek an abortion. Al-
80. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
81. Id. at 155, 163.
82. Id. at 155.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 162.
85. Id. at 162-63.
86. Id. at 163.
87. Id. For example, during the second trimester, the state may regulate by imposing
requirements as to the qualifications of the person who is to perform the abortion. Id.
88. Id. Viability is when the fetus is "potentially able to live outside the mother's
womb, albeit with artificial aid." Id. at 160. This usually occurs at "about seven months
(twenty-eight weeks) but may occur earlier, even at twenty-four weeks." Id.
89. Id. at 163-64. The Court's decision to uphold the federal ban marks the first time
since Roe that the Court "blesses a prohibition with no exception safeguarding a woman's
health." Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1641 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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though many perceive Roe as the landmark case outlining a woman's
right to choose, Casey most accurately describes current law. In Casey,
five abortion clinics and a physician brought facial challenges to sev-
eral provisions of Pennsylvania's Abortion Control Act of 1982.90
Writing for the Casey plurality, Justice O'Connor protected the
core of Roe by reaffirming what she deemed as its three central ten-
ets. 91 The Court upheld the right of a woman to choose to have an
abortion prior to viability and to obtain it without undue interference
from the state. 92 It confirmed the state's power to restrict abortion
after fetal viability93 if the law contains exceptions for pregnancies that
endanger the woman's life or health. 94 The Court reaffirmed that the
state has legitimate interests from the outset of the pregnancy in pro-
tecting the life and health of the woman and the potentiality of life.
95
Departing from Roe, the Casey Court rejected the rigid trimester
framework.9 6 It replaced the dividing line for determining when the
state's interest in potential life outweighs a woman's interest in seek-
ing an abortion at the point of fetal viability. 97 The plurality indicated
that the state's interest in potential life exists throughout pregnancy,
and it adopted the undue burden standard to evaluate abortion re-
strictions prior to viability.98 Thus, the Court moved away from the
strict scrutiny approach in Roe, allowing greater state interference dur-
90. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992). The first provi-
sion required informed consent and a twenty-four hour waiting period; the Court held this
was not an undue burden. Id. at 887. The second provision mandated informed parental
consent of a minor prior to abortion, but did provide a judicial by-pass procedure; the
Court deemed this constitutional. Id. at 899. The third provision required spousal notifica-
tion, unless certain exceptions applied; the Court struck this down as an undue burden. Id.
at 893-94. The Court upheld the last provisions and imposed certain reporting require-
ments on facilities providing abortion services. Id. at 901.
91. Id. at 846; Wharton et al., supra note 33, at 329.
92. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846.
93. Roe defined the point of fetal viability "at about seven months (twenty-eight weeks)
but [it] may occur earlier, even at twenty-four weeks." Roe, 410 U.S. at 160. Using fetal
viability as a distinction to determine when the state can and cannot regulate abortion
becomes increasingly problematic as advances in medicine and technology allow fetal via-
bility to occur earlier and earlier in the pregnancy.
94. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 870.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 876. Some believe that Casey offers less protection than Roe because the
majority replaced the strict scrutiny trimester test with the undue burden test. Wharton et
al., supra note 33, at 330 n.67. Roe fully protected the first trimester, and the right was
absolute. See id. at 330. Under Casey, the state has certain legitimate interests justifying
interference during the first trimester, so long as the regulation passes the undue burden
test. See id. Scholars, like Laurence Tribe, have argued that, in fact, Casey intended to pro-
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ing the once fully protected first trimester. 99 The Court, however, did
carefully reiterate that "[t]he woman's right to terminate her preg-
nancy before viability is the most central principle of Roe v. Wade. It is
a rule of law and a component of liberty we cannot renounce."'' t°
Today, any state action restricting access to abortion must meet
the undue burden test. An undue burden is found when "a state regu-
lation has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the
path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus." 10 1 The
Court explained that statutes with this purpose are invalid because
"the means chosen by the State to further the interest in potential life
must be calculated to inform the woman's free choice, not hinder
it."102
The Court instructed that the burden should be analyzed by look-
ing at the group of women affected by the restriction, "not the group
for whom the law is irrelevant."' 0 3 It firmly repudiated the rights-by-
numbers approach, stating that "[t]he analysis does not end with the
one percent of women upon whom the statute operates; it begins
there. Legislation is measured for consistency with the Constitution by
its impact on those whose conduct it affects."'01 4 Though the federal
ban does not affect a large number of women, the proper question is
whether the legislation has the purpose or effect of placing a substan-
tial obstacle in the path of these women seeking an abortion.10 5
vide greater protection of the right, evidenced by the plurality's emphasis on equality and
liberty. Id. at 330 n.67.
At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life .... Though abortion
is conduct, it does not follow that the State is entitled to proscribe it in all in-
stances. That is because the liberty of the woman is at stake in a sense unique to
the human condition and so unique to the law.
Casey, 505 U.S. at 851-52.
99. CENTER FOR REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS, Roe v. Wade-Then and Now (Jan. 2003),
http://www.reproductiverights.org/crt_roejbroe.html.
100. Casey, 505 U.S. at 871.
101. Id. at 877.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 894.
104. Id.
105. See Transcript of Record at 47, Gonzales v. Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am., 127
S. Ct. 1610 (2007) (No. 05-1382).
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B. The Supreme Court's Treatment of the Purpose Prong Since
Casey
Abortion jurisprudence has largely neglected the purpose prong
of Casey's undue burden test.1 0 6 Casey announced the test but pro-
vided scant details for applying it. 10 7 Although the best one can say of
the Court's reading of the purpose prong in Mazurek v. Armstrong,'"8
Stenberg v. Carhart, and Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New En-
gland'0 9 is that it is inconclusive, the need to "reestablish" this part of
Casey's test is paramount. 1 10 The legal strategy of the anti-abortion
movement focuses "on taking full advantage of any room for state reg-
ulation allowed by the Court""' by pushing legislation beyond the
bounds of the Constitution. Renewed reliance on the purpose prong
will require legislators to respect constitutional precedents because
statutes clearly drafted with the purpose of circumventing constitu-
tional standards will result in facial invalidation.'
12
1. Mazurek v. Armstrong
Mazurek v. Armstrong is the Court's most thorough examination of
the purpose prong of the undue burden test since Casey. 1 3 A group of
physicians and a physician assistant challenged the constitutionality of
a Montana statute that restricted the performance of abortions to li-
censed physicians.' 14 Because the "physician only" provision solely af-
fected physician assistant Susan Cahill, the district court held that
there was insufficient evidence in the record to show that the law im-
posed an undue burden." 5 The lower court also rejected plaintiffs
claim that the law had an improper purpose." 16 It used an impossibly
high threshold, holding that the plaintiff had not made a claim for
improper purpose because she had not shown that "none of the indi-
vidual legislators approving the passage of [the law] was motivated by
a desire to foster the health of a woman seeking an abortion."
'
"17
106. See Harvard Law Review Ass'n, supra note 37, at 2567.
107. See ud. at 2566.
108. 520 U.S. 968 (1997).
109. 125 S. Ct. 961 (2006).
110. Harvard Law Review Ass'n, supra note 37, at 2569.
111. Id. at 2564.
112. See id.
113. Wharton et al., supra note 33, at 343.
114. Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 969-70 (1997).
115. Armstrong v. Mazurek, 906 F. Supp. 561, 567 (D. Mont. 1995), rev'd, 94 F.3d 566




The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and relied
on the purpose prong of Casey to conclude that Montana's physician
only requirement was "arguably invalid because its purpose . . .may
have been to create a substantial obstacle to women seeking abor-
tions."' 18 It remanded the case, finding that plaintiffs met the burden
of demonstrating "a fair chance of success" on the purpose-prong
claim.1 1 9 The appellate court noted that the Supreme Court has not
provided instructions for finding legislative purpose under Casey, al-
though it has in other contexts outside of abortion. 120 For example, in
an Equal Protection challenge to redistricting legislation, the Court
stated that "[l]egislative purpose to accomplish a constitutionally for-
bidden result may be found when that purpose was 'the predominant
factor motivating the legislature's decision."' 1 2 1 Courts may find pur-
pose in both the "structure of the legislation" and the law's legislative
history. 122 The appellate court did not examine the legislative purpose
behind the law, but remanded to the district court to make such
determinations. 1 2 3
Before the district court could reconsider the issue, the Supreme
Court accepted certiorari and reversed the decision of the appellate
court. It concluded that respondents had not shown a fair chance of
success on their claim that the law would have an unconstitutional
effect. 124 The Court declined to address whether the court of appeals
identified an appropriate method for discerning improper legislative
purpose, focusing instead on the absence of evidence of adverse im-
pact on a woman's access to abortion. 125 In Justice Stevens's dissent,
he highlighted the fact that Montana's law targeted one particular
person, Susan Cahill, the only licensed physician assistant (a nonphysi-
cian under the statute) performing abortions in the state. 12 6 The legis-
lative hearings preceding the enactment of the statute that referenced
Cahill by name revealed the unconstitutional purpose of the law.'
27
Also, the proponents of the legislation were the same anti-abortion
groups who had "repeatedly targeted" her practice. 128 According to
118. Armstrong v. Mazurek, 94 F.3d at 567.
119. Id. at 568.
120. Id. at 567.
121. Id. (citing Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995)).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 568.
124. Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 976 (1997).
125. Id. at 974 n.2.
126. Id. at 977 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
127. Id. at 978 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 979 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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the dissent, the Montana law served no legitimate purpose because
the legislature's predominant motive was to make access to abortion
services more difficult by prohibiting physician assistants from per-
forming abortions. 129
The Mazurek majority did not clarify how litigants prove improper
legislative purpose, nor did it comment on the appropriateness of the
method advocated by the court of appeals. 130 Without further gui-
dance from the Supreme Court as to the preferred method for evalu-
ating improper legislative purpose, the analysis employed by the court
of appeals serves as a useful guideline. Under this analysis, a court may
determine whether an improper purpose was a predominant factor
motivating the federal ban by looking to the statute's structure and
legislative history.1 31
2. Stenberg v. Carhart
The Supreme Court previously considered whether a criminal
ban on certain abortion procedures violates the undue burden test
from Casey. In Stenberg v. Carhart, the Supreme Court struck down a
Nebraska law that criminalized doctors' use of certain second trimes-
ter surgical procedures, referred to as "partial-birth abortions." 132 The
majority focused exclusively on the effects prong of the Casey test to
invalidate the law, but Justice Ginsburg wrote a separate concurrence
to emphasize that Nebraska's statute was unconstitutional because of
its improper purpose.1 33
The majority found the statute unconstitutional for two indepen-
dent reasons.'34 First, it failed to distinguish between two abortion
procedures that entail partial delivery, the rarely used D&X and the
most commonly used second trimester procedure, D&E. 135 The ma-
jority upheld the lower court's conclusion that the ban effectively ap-
plied to both procedures, thereby unduly burdening a woman's right
129. Id. at 979-80 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
130. See id. at 974 (majority).
131. Outside the context of abortion jurisprudence, when conducting statutory analy-
sis, courts often look to the text of the statute and the legislative history documenting its
enactment to determine the statute's meaning. Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 20-22
(1983).
132. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 930 (2000).
133. Id. at 951-52 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
134. Id. at 930 (majority).
135. Id. at 938-39. Intact D&E (also called D&X) is the procedure prohibited by the
federal ban. 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (Supp. IV 2006).
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to terminate her pregnancy prior to viability. 136 Second, Nebraska's
statute excluded the constitutionally-required exception to allow doc-
tors to use the procedure if necessary for the health of the woman. 137
The Court held that "where substantial medical authority supports the
proposition that banning a particular abortion procedure could en-
danger women's health, Casey requires the statute to include a health
exception when the procedure is 'necessary, in appropriate medical
judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother.' "138
Understanding the Court's health exception requirement is criti-
cal to analyzing the current federal ban. The Stenberg Court explained
that the word "necessary" from Casey's phrase "necessary, in appropri-
ate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the
mother"13 9 does not refer to an absolute necessity or to absolute
proof.140 Because medical treatments and procedures are considered
appropriate (or inappropriate) in light of estimated comparative
health risks (and benefits) in particular cases depending on the indi-
vidual, the Court reasonably concluded that "[d] octors often differ in
their estimation of comparative health risks and appropriate treat-
ment."141 Judicial tolerance of differences in medical opinion allows
doctors to make decisions in the best interests of their patients with-
out being 100% certain that a given procedure is necessary for a wo-
man's health. Medical professionals testified before Congress that
such deference is crucial in the case of D&X because, in practice, a
physician cannot always determine before the procedure begins
whether a D&X or D&E procedure is most appropriate for the
individual. 142
Stenberg facially invalidated Nebraska's statute banning intact
D&E instead of offering a partial remedy and describing how the stat-
ute should be rewritten to comport with the Constitution.1 43 The Ne-
braska State Attorney General urged the Court to interpret the statute
in a way that would distinguish between D&X and D&E. 144 The Court
136. Id. at 939 ("Even if the statute's basic aim is to ban D&X, its language makes clear
that it also covers a much broader category of procedures. The language does not track the
medical differences between D&E and D&X .....
137. Id. at 937.
138. Id. at 938 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879
(1992)).
139. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992).
140. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 937.
141. Id.
142. Brief of the National Women's Law Center, supra note 43, at 6 n.5.
143. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 944-45.
144. Id. at 943.
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declined because it was "without power to adopt a narrowing construc-
tion of a state statute unless such a construction is reasonable and
readily apparent.' ' 14 5
Although the Court did not have to reach the question of
whether the Nebraska ban violated the purpose prong of the Casey
test, Justice Ginsburg's concurrence stressed that "if a statute burdens
constitutional rights and all that can be said on its behalf is that it is
the vehicle that legislators have chosen for expressing their hostility to
those rights, the burden is undue."'1 46 She warned legislators that they
could not pass restrictive laws simply as a means to protest the funda-
mental right to abortion, and she emphasized that a finding of im-
proper purpose is a sufficient reason to invalidate abortion
regulations. 47 The purpose prong prevents legislators from crafting
laws for the political purpose of chipping away at the private right
protected by Roe and Casey.' 48 Yet the federal ban was drafted for the
same strategic purpose as the Nebraska statute-not to advance the
state's interest in the potentiality of life or to preserve women's health,
but to weaken protection for the fundamental right to abortion.
3. Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New England
The Stenberg Court "did not agonize over the question of remedy,
striking down the statute in its entirety in the context of a facial chal-
lenge."'149 It viewed the lack of a health exception as per se unconstitu-
tional. 150 Six years later, in Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New
England, the Court struggled with the question of remedy in a facial
challenge to a New Hampshire parental notification statute.' 5 ' The
statute prohibited doctors from providing abortion services to preg-
nant minors until forty-eight hours after written notice of the pending
abortion was delivered to the patient's parent or guardian. 52 For the
first time, a unanimous Court acknowledged that Casey was the con-
trolling standard, and it concluded that, as written, the statute was
unconstitutional.15 3
145. Id. at 944.
146. Id. at 952 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
147. See id. at 951-52.
148. See id.
149. Wharton et al., supra note 33, at 349.
150. See Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 945-46.
151. See Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 126 S. Ct. 961, 964-65 (2006).
152. Id. at 964.
153. Id.; Wharton et al., supra note 33, at 350.
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Addressing the question of remedy, the Court stated, "the touch-
stone for any decision about remedy is legislative intent. . . .After
finding an application or portion of a statute unconstitutional, we
must next ask: Would the legislature have preferred what is left of its
statute to no statute at all?"'1 54 Claiming that legislative intent re-
mained an open question, the Court ducked the issue of remedy, re-
manding to the lower court to settle the issue. 155 By avoiding the
question of legislative intent, the Court simultaneously evaded analysis
of the law's purpose. 15 6
Because the Ayotte Court avoided the remedial question, the
Court's inaction is the most significant aspect of the decision.1 5 7 It did
not limit Casey nor "retreat from Casey's and Stenberes emphasis on the
paramount mandate to protect women's health." 158 Legal commenta-
tors have read Ayotte as establishing a holding pattern in the area of
abortion restrictions, heading off any major decision until a new
Court arrived at the bench. 159
HI. The Judicial Response to the Federal Ban and the
Supreme Court's Erosion of Roe and Casey in
Gonzales v. Carhart
The federal ban was challenged immediately after President
George W. Bush signed it into law. Three different United States dis-
trict courts, the Northern District of California in Planned Parenthood
Federation ofAmerica v. Ashcroft,160 the Southern District of New York in
National Abortion Federation v. Ashcrof,16 1 and the District of Nebraska
in Carhart v. Ashcroft,1 6 2 declared the ban unconstitutional.
United States Attorney General Alberto Gonzales appealed the
ruling by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit,
154. Ayotte, 126 S. Ct. at 968.
155. See id. at 969.
156. See id. at 967-69.
157. See Wharton et al., supra note 33, at 351 ("Ayotte is most notable for what it did not
do: adopt Salerno, retrench Casey, or retreat from Casey's and Stenberg's emphasis on the
paramount mandate to protect women's health.").
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. 320 F. Supp. 2d 957, 967 (N.D. Cal. 2004), affd sub nom. Planned Parenthood
Fed'n ofAm. v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2006), rev'd sub nom. Gonzales v. Planned
Parenthood Fed'n of Am., 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007).
161. 330 F. Supp. 2d 436, 483-84 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), affd sub nom. Nat'l Abortion Fed'n v.
Gonzales, 437 F.3d 278 (2nd Cir. 2006).
162. 331 F. Supp. 2d 805, 808 (D. Neb. 2004), affid sub nom. Carhart v. Gonzales, 413
F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 2005), rev'd sub nom. Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610.
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which affirmed the decision in Carhart v. Gonzales.163 He also appealed
the Ninth Circuit's decision to uphold Planned Parenthood Federation of
America v. Ashcrofl.164 Despite the lack of a circuit split and recent pre-
cedent directly on point in Stenberg, the Court granted review. 165
A. The Ninth Circuit Concludes the Federal Ban is
Unconstitutional: Planned Parenthood Federation of
America v. Gonzales
Directly after President Bush signed the federal ban into law,
Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc. filed suit claiming
that the statute violated its Fifth Amendment due process rights. 1 6 6
The City and County of San Francisco intervened as plaintiff because
enforcing the ban would "cause irreparable harm to the health and
safety of pregnant women in the City and County of San Francisco." 16 7
The district court held that the ban did indeed violate the Constitu-
tion, and it entered a permanent injunction against its
enforcement.168
In Planned Parenthood Federation of America v. Gonzales,169 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed that the
federal ban was unconstitutional for three reasons, "each of which
[was] sufficient to justify the district court's [permanent injunc-
tion] .'170 First, the law lacked the constitutionally-required health ex-
ception. 171 The court adhered to the holding in Stenberg that, without
163. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (No. 05-
1380).
164. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Gonzales v. Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am.,
127 S. Ct. 1610 (No. 05-1382).
165. Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007).
166. Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am. v. Ashcroft, 320 F. Supp. 2d 957, 967 (N.D. Cal.
2004).
167. City and County of San Francisco's Complaint in Intervention at 3, Planned
Parenthood Fed'n of Am. v. Ashcroft, 320 F. Supp. 2d 957, 967 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (No. 03-
4872).
168. Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am. v. Ashcroft, 320 F. Supp. 2d at 1035.
169. 435 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2006).
170. Id. at 1171. "We do not conclude that it is unconstitutional solely due to its lack of
a health exception." Id. at 1185.
171. Id. at 1171; see also Nat'l Abortion Fed'n v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 278 (2d Cir. 2006).
In National Abortion Federation, the Second Circuit limited its decision to the question of the
law's failure to include a health exception. Id. at 281. A group of physicians sued the
United States claiming the statute violated their due process rights under the Fifth Amend-
ment. Id. The District Court for the Southern District of New York declared the statute
unconstitutional for its lack of a maternal health exception and enjoined its enforcement.
Id. The appellate court explained its decision by saying, "The Supreme Court has held that
a health exception is constitutionally required for any statute prohibiting a method of
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a health exception, the ban "is unconstitutional except when there is a
medical consensus that no circumstance exists in which the procedure
would be necessary to preserve a woman's health." 172 Without a medi-
cal consensus, it is impossible for the legislature to determine that no
circumstances exist in which the procedure is necessary to preserve a
woman's health. 1 73 The Ninth Circuit looked at the relevant congres-
sional findings and found that even the "most cursory review" of the
congressional record reveals that no such medical consensus exists.174
Because the lack of consensus is "replete" throughout the record, the
failure to include a health exception renders the law
unconstitutional.1 75
The court struck down the federal ban for a second independent
reason: it imposes an undue burden on women's ability to obtain
previability abortions. 176 Like the Nebraska statute struck down in
Stenberg,17 7 the federal ban fails to distinguish between previability sec-
ond trimester abortion procedures. 1 78 Therefore, it imposes an undue
burden on a woman's right to choose an abortion. 1 79 It does not dif-
ferentiate between D&X and D&E procedures, thereby allowing fed-
eral prosecutors to pursue physicians who use non-intact D&E
procedures, the most commonly-used method for performing second
trimester abortions. 180
Third, the court deemed the ban unconstitutionally vague be-
cause it deprives "physicians of fair notice of what it prohibits and
[encourages] arbitrary enforcement."'' This would lead doctors to
"fear prosecution, conviction, and imprisonment" and have a chilling
effect on their willingness to perform second-trimester abortions,
abortion whenever substantial medical authority supports the proposition that banning a
particular abortion procedure could endanger women's health . . . ." Id. Because "such
substantial medical authority indisputably exists with respect to the D & X procedure ...
the lack of the health exception renders the Act unconstitutional." Id.
172. Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am. v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 1163, 1172 (9th Cir.
2006).
173. Id. at 1172-73.
174. Id. at 1175.
175. Id. at 1174, 1176.
176. Id. at 1171.
177. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 939 (2000).
178. See 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (a) (Supp. IV 2006); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 28-326(9)-28-328(1)
(Supp. 2006); Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 939.
179. See 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (a); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 28-326(9)-28-328(1); Stenberg, 530 U.S.
at 939.
180. Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am. v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d at 1177.
181. Id. at 1171-72.
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thereby imposing an undue burden on women's constitutional
rights. 18 2
The Ninth Circuit concluded that, in light of Ayotte, the only ap-
propriate remedy was to enjoin enforcement of the Act, therefore af-
firming the district court's decision to grant a permanent
injunction. 183
B. The Eighth Circuit Concludes the Federal Ban is
Unconstitutional: Carhart v. Gonzales
The day President Bush signed the federal ban into law, four phy-
sicians filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of
Nebraska challenging the constitutionality of the statute.18 4 The plain-
tiffs claimed that the law is unconstitutional for four reasons: (1) it
lacks a health exception; (2) it is overly broad and bans other types of
abortion procedures; (3) the law is vague; and (4) the life exception
included in the ban is too narrow. 185
The district court found the ban unconstitutional on two
grounds.186 First, the court concluded that Congress's findings of a
medical consensus were unreasonable and therefore the ban was un-
constitutional because it lacked a health exception. 187 Second, the
ban imposed an undue burden because it effectively covered the most
common late-term abortion procedure."8 Because the district court
concluded that the law had an improper effect, it declined to consider
the law's purpose. 189
The Eighth Circuit recognized that the case before it and the re-
cord in Stenberg were "similar in all significant aspects."' 190 It agreed
182. Id. at 1179.
183. Id. at 1184-85. The court reached its conclusion by applying the effects prong of
the undue burden test established in Casey. Id. at 1171. Under this analysis, "[t]he fact that
the statute is susceptible to some constitutional application will not save it from facial at-
tack." Id. The court declined the invitation to rewrite the statute to make it comport with
Stenbergs health exception requirement. Id. at 1187. In light of the ban's legislative history,
the court explained it would be improper for it to issue an injunction that essentially adds
a health exception to the statute. Id. Because "Congress purposefully excluded [a health
exception] .. . [writing one in] would be inconsistent with our proper judicial role." Id.
184. Carhart v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 791, 792 (8th Cir. 2005).
185. Carhart v. Ashcroft, 331 F. Supp. 2d 805, 814 (D. Neb. 2004).
186. Carhart v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d at 793.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Carhart v. Ashcroft, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 1003 n.109.
190. Carhart v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d at 803. As a preliminary matter, the circuit court
addressed the question of what standard to use in determining the constitutionality of the
statute. Id. at 794. It specifically declined to use the traditional and generally-used Salerno
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with the Fourth Circuit (and other district courts) that Stenberg estab-
lished a per se constitutional rule that the requirement of a health
exception applies to all abortion statutes. 19 1 Because the Supreme
Court already determined that substantial medical authority supports
the need for a health exception for D&X abortions, the Eighth Circuit
found the federal ban facially unconstitutional. 9 2
C. Undoing Constitutional Protection for the Right to Choose an
Abortion: Gonzales v. Carhart
On April 18, 2007, the anti-abortion movement celebrated one of
its biggest legal victories.' 9 3 In a five-to-four decision, the Supreme
Court upheld the federal ban, rejecting the conclusions of the Eighth
and Ninth Circuits by finding that the law is not void for vagueness,
does not impose an undue burden due to any overbreadth, and is not
invalid for its failure to include a health exception. 194 The decision
limits a woman's choice to three options: (1) compromise her health
and undergo a riskier but legal procedure; (2) violate the law in order
to obtain the safest procedure (if her physician will risk criminal liabil-
ity); or (3) refrain altogether from exercising her right to choose a
safe abortion.
After the decision, it is unclear what the future holds for abortion
rights. The majority boldly asserts that a "'rational ground' is enough
to uphold the Act," which is a substantial departure from the strict
scrutiny standard applied in Roe.'9 5 The decision marks the first time
since Roe that the Court has considered fetal life more important than
women's health. Until Carhart, the state's interest in potential life has
always been insufficient to overcome the combined interest of the
test, under which a statute is facially constitutional unless no set of circumstances exists
under which the legislation would be valid. Id. at 794-95. Instead, like the vast majority of
circuit courts, the court applied the abortion-specific standard (the undue burden test)
used in Stenberg. Id. at 794; see alsoAyotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 126 S. Ct.
961 (2006); Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Hicks, 409 F.3d 619, 627-28 (4th Cir.
2005); Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng. v. Heed, 390 F.3d 53, 57-59 (1st Cir. 2004).
191. Carhart v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d at 800.
192. Id. at 803.
193. David Stout, Supreme Court Upholds Ban on Abortion Procedure, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18,
2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/18/us/18cnd-scotus.html?ex=1183694400&en=
6fa1610d36a5fcb7&ei=5070.
194. Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1615 (2007). "Although Congress' findings
could not withstand the crucible of trial, the Court defers to the legislative override of our
Constitution-based rulings." Id. at 1652-53 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
195. Id. at 1650 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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state and the woman in her health. 196 Using outdated patriarchal rea-
soning, the majority insists the decision protects women because
"[w] omen who have abortions come to regret their choice and conse-
quently suffer from 'severe depression and loss of esteem.'"1
9 7
The majority failed to look meaningfully at the law's purpose,
even though "[t]he Act's sponsors left no doubt that their intention
was to nullify our ruling in Stenberg."19 8 Justice Ginsburg explained the
illegal purpose of the law in her dissent: "In candor, the Act, and the
Court's defense of it, cannot be understood as anything other than an
effort to chip away at the right declared again and again by this
Court-and with increasing comprehension of its centrality to wo-
men's lives." 199
IV. Applying Casey-The Illegal Purpose Behind the Federal
Ban
Previous Supreme Court case law establishes Justice Ginsburg as
the most prominent proponent of using the purpose prong to strike
down abortion restrictions. 20 0 She wrote a separate concurrence in
Stenberg to emphasize the unconstitutional purpose behind Nebraska's
ban on D&X abortions. 20 1 Like the federal ban, Nebraska's law failed
to advance the state's interest in protecting the life of the fetus as it
did not save any fetus from destruction. It targeted only a method of
abortion and did not advance the lives and health of pregnant wo-
men.20 2 Justice Ginsburg concluded that the law's purpose was to chip
away at the right of a woman to seek an abortion, a right protected by
Roe and Casey.20 3 Under Casey, a state regulation that "has the purpose
or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seek-
ing an abortion of a nonviable fetus" violates the Constitution. 20 4 Be-
cause the only purpose of the Nebraska law was to chip away at a
woman's right to abortion, it was unconstitutional. 20 5
196. See id. at 1641 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Court has consistently required
that laws regulating abortion, at any stage of pregnancy and in all cases, safeguard a wo-
man's health."); Brief of the American Medical Women's Ass'n, supra note 48, at 29-30.
197. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1648 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
198. Id. at 1643 n.4 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
199. Id. at 1653 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
200. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 951 (2000) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 952.
204. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992) (emphasis
added).
205. See Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 952 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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Likewise, because the only purpose of the federal ban is to ex-
press general anti-abortion hostility towards women's reproductive
freedom, the Court should have found it unconstitutional as well. Ex-
amining the legislative history of the law, looking at the plain lan-
guage of the statute, and questioning the sincerity of the
government's asserted interests, all reveal the improper purpose be-
hind the ban.
A. The Legislative History Behind the Ban
When President Bush signed the ban into law in 2003, it marked
the end of an eight-year struggle by its anti-abortion proponents. 20 6 It
also signified a validation of the anti-abortion movement's long-term
strategy of incrementalism, restricting abortion step by step as part of
the larger battle to turn public opinion against Roe.20 7 Congress had
previously passed the bill two times, but President Bill Clinton vetoed
it twice. 208 Clinton said, "I just cannot look at a woman.., and tell her
that I'm signing a law which will prevent her from ever having another
child."20 9 Clinton's emotional statement illustrates the repercussions
of Congress's deliberate flaunting of the required health exception-
that women face difficult and personal decisions when deciding
whether to have an abortion in their second trimester. Although a
victory for the anti-abortion movement, the ban constitutes a signifi-
cant departure from the Court's previous standards.
The principal goal of anti-abortion legislators is to continually
provoke the Supreme Court to re-consider Roe's recognition of wo-
men's right to reproductive freedom, therefore, pushing the Court to
curtail the right, little by little, until it is completely abrogated, and
Roe is overturned. 210 Ken Connor, the president of the conservative
Family Research Council, spelled out the strategy behind the federal
ban in an email reported by the Washington Post:. "With this bill ... we
are beginning to dismantle, brick by brick, the deadly edifice created
by Roe v. Wade."2 11
During the House debates, Representative Nadler commented
that it was as if the authors "went out of their way to thumb their noses
206. Robin Toner, For G.O.P., It's a Moment, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2003, at Al.
207. Id.
208. Carl Hulse, Lopszded Vote by Senators Against Type of Abortion, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14,
2003, at Al.
209. Alison Mitchell, Clinton, in Emotional Terms, Explains His Abortion Veto, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 14, 1996, at 10.
210. See Van Detta, supra note 45, at 243-44.
211. Ruth Marcus, 'Partial-birth,'Partial Truths, WASH. POST, June 4, 2003, at A27.
Summer 2007]
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
at the Supreme Court."2 12 The ban's authors deliberately excluded a
health exception, disregarding the Supreme Court's unambiguous re-
quirement. The bill's chief Senate sponsor, Senator Santorum, ex-
plained that "health is an exception that swallows the rule."21 3 "[It]
bars the bill, [and] stops the bill from having any effect." 214 Senator
Santorum was correct. Women have the D&E procedure due to health
complications;2 15 therefore, the ban is only effective at prohibiting the
procedure if no exception is made for health. Inserting a health ex-
ception undermines the very reason proponents drafted the bill-as
stated by President Bush, "[W]e need to ban partial-birth abortions
... [and doing so] would be a positive step toward reducing the num-
ber of abortions in America."2 16
President Bush openly revealed the improper purpose behind
the law. It is facially inaccurate to claim that the ban will reduce the
number of abortions in this country. The ban only prohibits a particu-
lar method of abortion-the fetus is still aborted under the ban, ex-
cept by a different procedure which may compromise the woman's
health. From this perspective, the ban will not reduce the number of
abortions in America, as the President claims. However, anti-abortion-
ists intended for the law to have a chilling effect, thereby decreasing
the availability of physicians willing to provide abortion services. The
drafters intentionally employed vague and imprecise terminology in
the statute so that doctors will fear and avoid performing abortions as
a precaution to avoid criminal prosecution.2 1 7 Casey explicitly held
that to further the state's interest in potential life, the state must "in-
form" the woman's free choice, not hinder it.218 Banning a method of
212. H.R. REP. No. 108-58, at 73-74 (2003).
213. 149 CONG. REC. S12,942 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 2003) (statement of Sen. Santorum).
214. Id.
215. Brief of the National Women's Law Center supra note 43, at 8 ("For all women,
the intact D&E procedure provides certain health and safety benefits. Among other advan-
tages, it minimizes the risk of perforation of the uterus, laceration of the cervix, infection,
and hemorrhage.").
216. The 2000 Campaign; Transcript of Debate Between Vice President Gore and Governor Bush,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2000, at A31.
217. The federal ban also includes a civil liability provision allowing the father of the
fetus (if the mother is married) or the maternal grandparents of the fetus (if the mother is
a minor) to sue the physician for money damages for performing intact D&E. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1531 (c) (Supp. IV 2006). The imposition of civil liability, in addition to criminal liability,
increases the likelihood that some physicians will discontinue providing second trimester
abortions altogether in order to avoid the risk ofjail time and money damages. Addition-
ally, by allowing the father or grandparents to sue on behalf of the fetus, this provision
demonstrates that the law's drafters valued the rights of the fetus more than the rights of
the woman.
218. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992).
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abortion does not inform the woman, but instead hinders her ability
to exercise her constitutional right.
The congressional debates over the legislation reveal the political
motivations behind the law. The majority of the Senate voted on an
amendment to the statute to include an explicit commitment to up-
hold Roe. The resolution's proposed language stated: "It is the sense of
the Senate that-(1) the decision of the Supreme Court in Roe v.
Wade was appropriate and secures an important constitutional right;
and (2) such decision should not be overturned. '" 219 This amendment
was introduced by Senators Tom Harkin and Barbara Boxer to affirm
support for a woman's constitutional right to abortion. 22 0 Opponents
of the amendment (an affirmation of current law) called it ex-
treme.2 2 In about five minutes, the House of Representatives stripped
the amendment from the bill, demonstrating its intent to unravel
Roe's protections rather than uphold them.2 22 This caused great con-
sternation during the debates. Illustrating one of the many com-
plaints, Representative Lautenberg exclaimed, "Stripping [the ban] of
the Harkin Amendment reaffirming Roe v. Wade shows us what the
President and his anti-choice allies are really after. They want to over-
turn Roe v. Wade, [the ban] puts them on that path." 223
The constitutionality of Roe was the centerpiece of congressional
discussion. The statement of Representative Toomey illustrates its
prominence in the debates. He explained:
This bill establishes what I see as at least a minimum level of re-
spect for human life; but, frankly, we have got a long way to go. I
would like to address the Roe v. Wade decision which has come up
repeatedly .... The fact is it is a terrible decision that has resulted
in the deaths of millions of unborn babies. But even if the immo-
rality of the decision does not move someone, I would think the
contempt for the Constitution that it demonstrates ought to. Be-
cause let us face it, you can read the Constitution. It is written in
English, and it is very clear. The Constitution does not guarantee a
right to have abortions. 224
219. 149 CONG. REC. S11,604 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 2003) (statement of Sen. Feinstein).
220. 149 CONG. REc. SI1,602 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 2003) (statement of Rep. Dodd).
221. 149 CONG. REC. S11,603 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 2003) (statement of Rep.
Lautenberg).
222. 149 CONG. REC. S12,917 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 2003) (statement of Sen. Boxer); 149
Cong. Rec. H9137 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 2003) (statement of Rep. Slaughter). "This [removing
the Roe-supportive language] emphasizes the true purpose of the legislation: targeting a
woman's right to privacy, with the hope that a Supreme Court with a newjustice or two will
weaken or reverse Roe." Id.
223. 149 CONG. REc. SI1,602 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 2003) (statement of Rep.
Lautenberg).
224. 149 CONG. REc. H9140 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 2003) (statement of Rep. Toomey).
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Although proponents claim the government's interest in the fed-
eral ban is about protecting the sanctity of life, Representative Too-
mey and the complete legislative history of the ban show that the
government's true interest lies in passing a stepping stone to overturn
Roe.
While the state does have legitimate interests in regulating abor-
tion (limited to preserving the life and health of the woman and the
potentiality of life), the legislators were more interested in using the
ban to chip away at reproductive rights. During the debate, Santorum
explained why he authored the bill: "Roe v. Wade is, according to the
Court, how they will decide abortion cases. I vehemently disagree with
them and I will continue to fight on this floor [until the decision is
overturned] ."225 Given that the ban does not save any fetus from de-
mise nor protect women's health, the law significantly weakens Roe's
protections. Its only effect is to narrow women's access to abortion by
criminalizing one of their safest options.226 Furthermore, the law's in-
tentional vagueness will have a chilling effect on physicians, causing
many to fear prosecution and avoid providing second-trimester abor-
tions altogether.
Another component of the ban's legislative history to consider is
the political movement behind the bill. The federal ban is part of the
overall strategy of the anti-abortion movement to overturn Roe. Com-
menting on the significance of Carhart, Roberta Combs, president of
the Christian Coalition of America, said, "[I] t is just a matter of time
before the infamous Roe v. Wade decision in 1973 will also be struck
down by the [C]ourt."227 For years, the anti-abortion movement has
"focused on passing step-by-step abortion restrictions in state legisla-
tures and the Congress," working to gradually eviscerate women's re-
productive freedom. 228 The ban is just one limitation employed to
limit women's access to abortion and works in conjunction with nu-
merous other calculated limitations, including mandatory waiting pe-
riods, state-scripted counseling provisions, licensing and regulatory
schemes for abortion facilities, state-mandated counseling require-
225. 149 CONG. REc. S12,943 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 2003) (statement of Sen. Santorum).
226. 149 CONG. REC. Sl1,602 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 2003) (statement of Rep. Lautenberg)
("The underlying bill makes a pretense of protecting women but really, what we have here
is a bill that takes away rights while doing nothing to help anyone.").
227. Stout, supra note 193.
228. Robin Toner & Adam Liptak, In New Court, Roe May Stand, So Foes Look to Limit its
Scope, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2005, at Al.
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ments, public and private funding restrictions, and rules requiring pa-
rental involvement. 229
The federal ban in particular has helped the movement galvanize
support through its use of emotional and gruesome language to de-
scribe the medical procedure. 230 Dr. Deirdre Gifford, a professor at
Brown University explains, "Focusing on the particulars of this one
procedure is missing the point. Any procedure you use [in the second
trimester] is pretty distasteful."231 Anti-abortion activists have capital-
ized on the unpleasant nature of the procedure to rally support for
the movement to overturn Roe. But when political public relations
campaigns use complex medical details to further their cause, impor-
tant facts get lost in the emotional rhetoric. Gifford asks, "[W]hat is
the alternative [to the procedure]? Women whose lives and health are
wrecked, babies with severe disabilities that drain precious medical re-
sources, and children born to families who don't have the psychologi-
cal or financial means to take care of them. '23 2 The strategic choice to
focus on "partial-birth" abortions was ingenious. As Gifford says, 'You
can't win an argument [in which one side is] talking about punctur-
ing a hole in a baby's head. '23 3 Gifford's frustration demonstrates why
the purpose prong is vital to analysis of the federal ban. Focusing on
the effects of the law restricts the debate to complex and emotional
medical issues. Analyzing the law's purpose reveals what is at stake
with the federal ban and why it is so dangerous to women's fundamen-
tal right to choose an abortion.
Anti-abortion forces calculated the timing of the federal ban so
that, by the time the legal challenges reached the Supreme Court,
there would be new Justices likely to limit the scope of Roe's protec-
tions. 234 In spite of previous presidential vetoes and the Supreme
Court's disapproval, abortion opponents pushed the law through
Congress, "betting that the Supreme Court would soon be different:
more conservative, and more open to an array of new abortion restric-
tions."235 The legislative director for the National Right to Life Com-
mittee, Douglas Johnson, explained the tactic: "We hope that by the
time this ban reaches the Supreme Court, at least five Justices will be
229. See STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF, supra note 25.
230. Toner & Liptak, supra note 228.
231. Roy Rivenburg, Partial Truths, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1997, at El.
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willing to reject such extremism" (referring to current abortion
law) .236
Over ten years prior to Carhart, in Jane L. v. Bangerter,237 the
Tenth Circuit found improper purpose because the statute plainly dis-
regarded Supreme Court precedent. "In our view, the State's determi-
nation to define viability in a manner specifically and repeatedly
condemned by the Court evinces an intent to prevent a woman from
exercising her right to choose an abortion after twenty weeks in those
instances in which the fetus is not viable." 238 During the beginning of
oral arguments before the Supreme Court in Gonzales v. Carhart, Jus-
tice Breyer compared the congressional findings in the federal ban
with the record from Stenberg. For all intents and purposes, it is the
same record: "[I]n each case . . . there are some doctors who think
this is safe and some doctors who think it isn't safe." 23 9 Congress's
decision to pass a federal law clearly inconsistent with the Court's
abortion jurisprudence serves as evidence of improper intent to bur-
den the constitutional right.
B. Language of the Ban
The text of the federal ban is remarkably similar to the Nebraska
ban struck down by the Supreme Court in 2000.240 First, like the Ne-
braska law, the federal ban fails to limit the stage of pregnancy to
which it applies, criminalizing abortions throughout pregnancy. 241
This is contrary to what many of the ban's sponsors claim: that the
statute affects only late term or post-viability procedures. 24 2 Yet during
oral arguments in Gonzales v. Carhart, the Solicitor General, Paul D.
Clement, admitted that the statute "applies to both sides of the viabil-
ity line. ' 243 Compared to the Nebraska ban, Congress did add some
descriptive words regarding the procedures targeted. When ques-
tioned about the difference between the statutes, Clement explained
that the two are distinct because of the "addition of the anatomical
236. Toner & Liptak, supra note 228.
237. 102 F.3d 1112 (10th Cir. 1996).
238. Id. at 1117.
239. Transcript of Record at 7-8, Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007) (No. 05-
380).
240. CENTER FOR REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS, UNCONSTITUTIONAL ASSAULT ON THE RIGHT TO
CHOOSE: FEDERAL ABORTION BAN iS AN AFFRONT TO WOMAN AND THE SUPREME COURT 7
(Dec. 2003), http://www.reproductiverights.org/pdf/pub -bp-uncon-assault.pdf.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Transcript of Record at 12, Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007) (No. 05-
380).
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landmark language to the Federal statute. '24 4 These changes are
"merely cosmetic" and still fail to define at what point a doctor will be
criminally liable for his or her actions. 245 Although it is settled consti-
tutional law that Congress cannot simply ignore a legal ruling it dis-
likes by adopting its own conflicting legislative findings, this is exactly
what has happened.246 In a different context, Justice Clarence
Thomas wrote, if Congress "could make a statute constitutional simply
by 'finding' that black is white or freedom, slavery, judicial review
would be an elaborate farce.."2 47
Second, like Nebraska's law, the ban fails to limit its prohibitions
to abortion involving an "intact" fetus, fails to explicitly exclude the
D&E technique or the suction curettage abortion method from its
prohibitions, and fails to define key terms such as "living" or "comple-
tion of delivery" to provide doctors notice of the meaning of the law
on the operating table. 248 The same vagueness and overbreadth
problems in Nebraska's law plague the federal ban. It effectively
criminalizes numerous safe and otherwise legal procedures instead of
just one procedure as the statute's sponsors allege. 249
The language of the ban is purposefully emotional; it intention-
ally dramatizes the ugliness of abortion to gain political support. The
findings section of the statute states that the "gruesome and inhu-
mane nature of the partial-birth abortion procedure and its disturbing
similarity to the killing of a newborn infant promotes a complete dis-
regard for infant human life .... -250 As Judge Posner stated, the lan-
guage of the ban is "[w]hipped up by activists who wanted to
dramatize the ugliness of abortions and deter physicians from per-
forming them .... "251 This conflicts with Casey, where the plurality
warned that courts must not make decisions based on whether ajudge
(or in the case of the ban, a legislator) finds the procedure morally
244. Transcript of Record at 26, Gonzales v. Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am., 127 S.
Ct. 1610 (2007) (No. 05-1382).
245. Tamara F. Kushnir, Comment, It's My Body, It's My Choice: The Partial-Birth Abortion
Ban Act of 2003, 35 Loy. U. C-H. L.J. 1117, 1164 (2004).
246. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 616 (2000).
247. Marcus, supra note 211.
248. CENTER FOR REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS, supra note 240, at 7.
249. See Justice Breyer's comment in Stenberg. "[T]he language of [these statutes] does
not track the medical differences between D&E and D&X-though it would have been a
simple matter, for example, to provide an exception for the performance of D&E and
other abortion procedures." Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 939 (2000).
250. Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-105, § 2(14) (L), 117 Stat.
1201, 1206 (2003) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1531 note 14(L) (Supp. IV 2006)).
251. Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 195 F.3d 857, 880 (7th Cir. 1999) (Posner, J., dissenting).
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objectionable. 252 Morals legislation is also prohibited by Lawrence v.
Texas,25 3 where the Court ruled that "the fact that the governing ma-
jority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as im-
moral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the
practice .... "254
In Okpalobi v. Foster,2 55 a panel of the Fifth Circuit concluded that
a Louisiana law creating tort liability for medical professionals provid-
ing abortion services was unconstitutional in part because of its im-
proper purpose. The court found evidence of improper purpose in
the language of the statute. 25 6 While the State's alleged purpose was to
inform the woman's choice and ensure that doctors shared informa-
tion of the risk of abortion with their patients, the "plain language"
and the structure of the statute "put the lie to" the State's asserted
interests. 25 7 The court concluded that "it is undeniable that the provi-
sion is designed not to supplement the Woman's Right to Know Act,
but to ensure that a physician cannot insulate himself from liability by
advising a woman of the risks . . . associated with abortion."2 58 Like-
wise, Congress dedicated half of the federal ban's findings section to
argue that a court should uphold the law, rather than explaining why
the law was "actually good legislative policy."259
The operative language of the federal ban plainly conflicts with
Roe, Casey, and Stenberg because of the lack of a health exception. 2 60 In
Planned Parenthood Federation of America v. Gonzales, the Ninth Circuit
emphasized that Congress did not "inadvertently" omit a health ex-
ception. 26 1 It was a "deliberate effort"262 to challenge the constitu-
252. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992).
253. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
254. Id. at 577.
255. 981 F. Supp. 977 (E.D. La. 1998), affid, 190 F.3d 337 (5th Cir. 1999), rev'd on other
grounds, 244 F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc).
256. See Okpalobi, 190 F.3d at 356.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 357.
259. See Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-105, § 2, 117 Stat.
1201, 1201-1206 (2003) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1531 notes 1-14 (Supp. IV 2006)) (listing
justifications for why courts should defer to congressional findings in the federal ban);
Kushnir, supra note 245, at 1176.
260. See Alex Gordon, Recent Development: The Partzal-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, 41
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 501, 511 (2004) ("Despite various claims to the contrary, the 2003 [fed-
eral ban] unmistakably suffers from one of the same defects the Supreme Court declared
unconstitutional in Carhart, the lack of an exception to the ban to protect the health of a
patient.").




tional protection of a woman's health. Contravening over thirty years
of Supreme Court jurisprudence requiring a health exception reveals
Congress's intent to flout the law and push the issue until the estab-
lishment of a new Court more sympathetic to its cause. An agenda
with such improper purpose is prohibited under Casey because when
"a statute burdens constitutional rights and all that can be said on its
behalf is that it is the vehicle that legislators have chosen for expres-
sing their hostility to those rights, the burden is undue. '263
Casey's purpose test is valuable because it deters legislative over-
reaching by invalidating abortion restrictions in their entirety when
they are at odds with current law. 264 It encourages legislators to "color
within the lines" of permissible law-making, instead of pushing consti-
tutional limits with every bill. Courts should rely on the purpose
prong to protect the sanctity of Roe, because it disallows laws drafted
with the intent to weaken constitutional protection for a woman's
right to choose an abortion.
C. The Insincerity of the Government's Stated Interests: How Anti-
Abortion Legislators Hid Their Unconstitutional
Purpose
Justice O'Connor provided a loophole for the anti-abortion
movement. In Stenberg she said that if the ban was rewritten to include
a health exception and to resolve the vagueness problems, it would
likely withstand constitutional scrutiny.265 Proponents of the ban de-
clined this invitation; because, with a health exception, there is no
reason to have the law at all.26 6 The unconstitutional purpose behind
the ban demands facial invalidation, regardless of adherence to Jus-
tice O'Connor's suggestions. The alleged interests of the state are
"nothing but a veiled attempt to undermine the Supreme Court's
landmark ruling in Roe versus Wade. '267
Congress asserted that the banned procedure is "not only unnec-
essary to preserve the health of the mother, but in fact poses serious
263. Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1653 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quot-
ing Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 952 (2000)).
264. Harvard Law Review Ass'n, supra note 37, at 2565.
265. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 951.
266. Senator Santorum complained, "Health is an exception that swallows the rule."
149 CONG. REc. S12,942 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 2003) (statement of Sen. Santorum). Like many
anti-abortionists, Santorum argued that, "In practice, of course, health means anything, so
there is no restriction at all." 149 CONG. REc. S3607 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 2003) (statement of
Sen. Santorum).
267. 149 Cong. Rec. H9138 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 2003) (statement of Rep. Hoyer).
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risks to the long-term health of women and in some circumstances,
their lives." 268 In great contrast, the American College of Obstetricians
and Gynecologists concluded that intact D&E procedures "may be the
best or most appropriate ... in a particular circumstance to save the
life or preserve the health of a woman."2 69 Instead of protecting wo-
men's health, the ban prevents physicians from "providing the care
that is most likely to avoid potentially catastrophic health out-
comes." 2 70 The ban will force physicians to use alternative abortion
procedures, imposing a "risk of increased harms" 2 7 1 in order to avoid
criminal prosecution. During oral arguments in Gonzales v. Planned
Parenthood Federation of America, Justice Breyer relied on the medical
testimony before the Court and explained:
[D]octor after doctor who takes the other position [that a health
exception to the federal ban is medically necessary] ... say: Look,
all that we're doing here is trying to remove the fetus in a single
pass. The fetus is going to die anyway. It's not viable. We're trying
to remove it in a single pass, and the reason we're trying to do that
is if we don't, there may be bone fragments left inside the womb.
There may be fetal parts left inside the womb. Every time you make
another pass, it turns out there's an added risk of scarring or hurt-
ing the inside of the womb. If you try to induce demise through a
drug before, there is serious risk[ ] of introducing drugs into the
system. If the woman has uterine cancer, it's a serious problem
272
Justice Kennedy continued this line of discussion, highlighting
the risks associated with causing fetal demise in order to avoid crimi-
nal liability, particularly in cases where women have certain health
conditions. The government conceded these risks; after Kennedy
listed the risks of performing fetal demise prior to the procedure, in
particular when women have cancer, the Solicitor General stated,
"[t]here is a risk .... "273 Thus, while doing nothing to preserve fetal
life, the law "bars a woman from choosing intact D&E although her
268. Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-105, § 2(2), 117 Stat.
1201, 1201 (2003) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1531 note 2 (Supp. IV 2006)).
269. Brief of the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, supra note 62,
at 2.
270. Id. at 3.
271. Id. The averted harms include massive hemorrhaging, serious infection, and sub-
sequent infertility. Id at 2.
272. Transcript of Record at 4, Gonzales v. Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am., 127 S.
Ct. 1610 (2007) (No. 05-1382).
273. Id. at 7.
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doctor 'reasonably believes [the procedure] will best protect
[her].' "274
While the ban fails to safeguard women's health, it also fails to
advance the state interest in fetal life because the fetus will be aborted
regardless of imposition of the ban. Proponents of the legislation do
not accept this outcome and argued during the debates that the law
would "save lives."2 75 During oral arguments in Gonzales v. Carhart, So-
licitor General Clement attempted to argue that the federal ban pre-
vented "infanticide," but Justice Ginsburg corrected him, saying,
"General Clement, that's not what this case is about, because ... we're
not talking about whether any fetus will be preserved by this legisla-
tion .... So anything about infanticide, babies, all that, is just besides
the point because what this bans is a method of abortion.."276
If the government's interest is not what it claims, meaning the law
will not protect women's health or the potentiality of life, what is the
purpose of the federal ban? The real purpose is to criminalize abor-
tion methods that closely resemble other common procedures so that
women's right to abortion is effectively chilled. The law's vague and
non-medical terms intentionally fail to provide doctors with adequate
notice of the procedures they may and may not perform. A scholar of
abortion rights, David J. Garrow, explains that the real effect of the
law is "the extent to which it intimidates doctors."2 77
In response to challenges questioning the sincerity of the state's
interests in the federal ban, the government is likely to claim its inter-
est has more to do with protecting the sanctity of or respect for life
than preventing fetal demise.278 Yet, as the legislative history and lan-
guage of the ban make abundantly clear, this was not Congress's pur-
pose in enacting this bill.
274. Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1647 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quot-
ing Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 946 (2000)).
275. 149 Cong. Rec. H9140 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 2003) (statement of Rep. Garrett).
276. Transcript of Record at 15-16, Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007) (No.
05-380).
277. Toner & Liptak, supra note 228.
278. For example, during oral arguments, the Solicitor General conceded that the ban
would not save any fetuses from destruction, but he claimed, "Congress has an interest in
maintaining the spatial line between infanticide and abortion, even with respect to pre-
viability fetuses... " Transcript of Record at 17, Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007)
(No. 05-380).
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V. Conclusion
Casey unambiguously requires that to further the state's interest
in potential life, the state must "inform the woman's free choice, not
hinder it."2 79 Yet prohibiting abortion procedures does not "inform"
the woman of her options; it limits them at the cost of her health and
ability to have healthy children in the future. It does so in the name of
an unconstitutional purpose-to narrow the right to abortion until it
is essentially meaningless, and Roe is overturned.
Congress may encourage women to carry pregnancies to term,
but is forbidden from interfering with women's right to choose an
abortion. 280 There are numerous legitimate ways the government
could promote childbirth. If it was the sincere interest of the govern-
ment to protect the health and life of the woman and the potentiality
of life, the government could provide women with food and shelter,
access to prenatal care and education, and universal health care. Or,
at the very least, it could require health insurance to cover contracep-
tives.28 ' Legislative efforts could focus on drafting laws providing eco-
nomic incentives to employers who offer paid leave and benefits for
parents, or work to close the earnings gap between the sexes so wo-
men have a fair opportunity to make a living wage to support their
children. Instead, the government's interest in the fetus ends at its
birth and raising the child becomes "her problem."
There is evidence supporting this proposition and proving that
the goals of protecting the fundamental right to abortion and decreas-
ing the number of abortions can simultaneously be achieved. For ex-
ample, Vermont has focused legislative efforts on providing options
rather than imposing restrictions. It has not enacted any comprehen-
sive abortion laws since Roe was decided.28 2 In 2000, 93.5% of all Ver-
mont residents had health insurance; this has resulted in the lowest
rate of teenage pregnancy in the nation because it has expanded op-
portunities for young women to "visit physicians, obtain counseling,
receive sex education, and afford birth control pills and other contra-
ceptives .. . ."283 Expanding health care for women can affect the
279. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992).
280. Id. at 878.
281. See Van Detta, supra note 45, at 276 ("[W]hile almost all traditional indemnity
insurance plans provide coverage for some prescription drugs, only about half cover any of
the five contraceptive methods available by prescription .... [Miany ... cover the cost of
Viagra for men (to the tune of ten dollars per pill), but do not cover the cost of contracep-
tive pills for women (which average one dollar per day).").
282. Id. at 275 n.232.
283. Id. at 275 n.233.
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number of women facing the decision to terminate their pregnancies.
Rather than squander judicial resources by pushing courts to review
legislation clearly beyond the bounds of the law, political resources
would be best spent revamping our social structure so that women are
not in the difficult position of deciding whether or not to have an
abortion in the first place.
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